SBC Summit Europe: The Challenges Every European Regulated Market Shares

SBC Summit Europe | 19-21 April 2027 | RAI Amsterdam

With 27 European countries now operating some form of multi-licensing for online gambling, it is natural that very different approaches to regulation have emerged across the continent.

But Europe’s different regulatory models also provide a fascinating test of how policy decisions can produce very different outcomes, including some that were never intended.

Can tighter restrictions weaken channelisation? Can stronger player-protection measures inadvertently make unlicensed operators more attractive? And should affiliates be regulated directly, or should responsibility ultimately sit with the operators they promote?

These are questions being asked across Europe. And while the solutions differ from market to market, the challenges remain remarkably similar.

With SBC Summit Europe taking place at RAI Amsterdam from 19–21 April next year, we thought it a good time to examine some of the biggest challenges facing regulated gambling markets across the continent. In this blog, we’ll look at how channelisation and black-market competition, player protection and affiliate regulation are playing out across Europe, and what different jurisdictions can learn from one another.

Channelisation and the Black-Market Challenge

Perhaps the clearest shared challenge for regulated gambling markets is channelisation: keeping players and gambling spend within the licensed system rather than losing them to unregulated operators.

For regulators, high channelisation matters because it determines how much of the market actually sits within the protections they have created. Licensing requirements, safer gambling measures and tax obligations have limited effect if significant numbers of players choose operators outside the regulated system.

The challenge is that channelisation depends on more than enforcement. 

Regulators also have to ensure the licensed market remains competitive enough for players to choose it.

Germany provides one example. A study commissioned by its regulator, the GGL, estimated that 77.03% of online gambling took place within the regulated market, leaving almost 23% outside it.

The regulator has made clear that it wants to push that figure higher. From July 2026, the GGL introduced a temporary framework allowing qualifying players to stake more than the standard €1 limit on virtual slots, with stakes of up to €3 available to players aged 21 and over and up to €5 permitted under additional monitoring and qualification requirements.

The temporary framework is a useful example of how regulators can adapt when existing rules risk weakening the licensed market. By allowing qualifying players greater flexibility while retaining additional monitoring requirements, the GGL is attempting to make the regulated offer more competitive with illegal operators without abandoning player protections.

For operators, that creates more scope to compete on product. For players, it provides greater freedom within the regulated market while keeping those higher-stake options inside the licensed system. The framework runs until the end of 2027, after which the GGL will assess its impact.

The Netherlands shows another side of the same problem.

According to the KSA’s spring 2026 monitoring report, around 91% of Dutch players used only legal operators. But when channelisation was measured according to gambling revenue rather than the number of players, the figure stood at just 53%.

The two figures tell very different stories. A market can appear highly channelised when measured by player numbers while still losing a much larger share of gambling spend to unlicensed operators.

It also shows why channelisation is not a single, settled measure of market health. 

Even where most players use licensed operators, illegal sites can still attract significant spend, particularly when they are not bound by the same tax, product or player-protection requirements as regulated businesses.

In Great Britain, Gambling Commission research identified more than 1,000 unique illegal gambling websites accessed by consumers between May 2024 and July 2025.

The regulator has responded with thousands of disruption notices and referred hundreds of thousands of URLs to search engines for removal, while the UK government has committed £26 million over three years to strengthen action against illegal gambling.

Together, these examples point to the same conclusion.

Improving channelisation requires regulators to work on both sides of the market. They can disrupt illegal websites, advertising and payment routes, but they also have to consider whether the rules applied to licensed operators leave consumers with a sufficiently attractive regulated alternative.

That is where the debate becomes more difficult. Measures designed to protect players can strengthen the regulated market, but if restrictions widen the gap between licensed and unlicensed operators too far, critics argue that some consumers may simply look elsewhere.

That balancing act is particularly visible in the way European markets approach player protection.

Getting Player Protection Right

Player protection is essential to any healthy regulated gambling market. Deposit limits, affordability checks, self-exclusion tools and product controls all exist to reduce harm and give consumers safeguards they would not necessarily receive from an unlicensed operator.

The challenge lies in getting the balance right. If protections become too restrictive, regulators and industry stakeholders have warned that licensed operators can become less attractive than unregulated alternatives, potentially pushing players out of the bounds of regulators’ protection.

The Netherlands demonstrates the complexity of this balancing act.

Since October 2024, adult players wishing to set monthly deposit limits above €350, or €150 for younger adults, have been required to first make contact with their operator. Operators are also expected to assess whether players can afford their gambling when net monthly deposits exceed €700 for adults aged 24 and over, or €300 for those aged 18 to 23.

On player protection, the measures appear to have delivered results.

The KSA found that the proportion of players depositing above those affordability thresholds fell from 9.7% to 2.2%. Average monthly losses per player account also fell by 31% in the eight months following the introduction of the measures.

But there has been another consequence.

KSA Chair Michel Groothuizen has acknowledged that the measures reduced the GGR of licensed operators and contributed to declining channelisation when measured by gambling revenue. The regulator’s spring 2026 monitoring report similarly suggested that some players may be suffering much higher losses with illegal operators, where the same protections do not apply, although this is naturally hard to quantify.

That does not necessarily mean the Dutch rules have failed. Reducing extreme player losses is precisely what stronger player-protection measures were designed to achieve.

Instead, the Netherlands highlights the difficult question facing other regulated markets: how do you strengthen safeguards without widening the gap between the licensed and unlicensed offer so far that some players simply move outside the system?

Germany, meanwhile, is testing whether greater flexibility can help keep players within the regulated market, including by allowing qualifying players to stake above the standard €1 virtual-slot limit under additional monitoring requirements.

Great Britain has pursued a more targeted approach. Since February 2025, remote operators have been required to carry out light-touch financial vulnerability checks when a customer’s net deposits exceed £150 over a rolling 30-day period. In July 2026, the Gambling Commission also announced more detailed financial risk assessments for higher-spending customers.

Rather than imposing blanket spending limits, both measures are designed to be largely frictionless and document-free, targeting intervention at customers showing signs of financial difficulty while avoiding unnecessary checks for those who are not.

The Dutch, German and British approaches are different, but all are trying to solve the same problem. The Netherlands has introduced tighter deposit and affordability controls, Germany is testing whether greater product flexibility can coexist with player safeguards, while Great Britain is pursuing a more targeted approach based on identifying financial vulnerability.

Who Should Regulate the Affiliates?

Affiliate regulation creates another common challenge across Europe: how closely affiliates should be regulated, and whether responsibility should sit with the affiliate itself or the operator it promotes.

Romania takes a direct licensing approach to affiliates. Rather than operating solely through commercial agreements with licensed operators, gambling affiliates must obtain a Class II licence from the ONJN, bringing them directly within the country’s regulatory framework.

That oversight comes at a significant cost for the affiliates themselves. Class II licence holders must pay a €20,000 annual licence fee and a €15,000 responsible gambling contribution, alongside a €10,500 licence issuance fee. 

For regulators, the model provides greater direct oversight of the businesses directing players towards gambling operators. But for affiliates, it also increases the cost of participating in the regulated market.

The UK takes a different approach. Affiliates do not need an equivalent dedicated gambling licence. Instead, licensed operators are responsible for ensuring that affiliates advertising on their behalf comply with the relevant rules. Under the Gambling Commission’s Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice, operators can face regulatory action if contracted third parties breach those requirements.

The two systems therefore place accountability in different places.

Romania brings affiliates directly inside the licensing regime, giving the regulator more direct oversight but also increasing the cost of market participation. Great Britain largely leaves affiliates outside the licensing framework and instead makes operators responsible for the partners they choose.

For other European markets considering tighter affiliate oversight, that creates another useful comparison. The challenge is shared: ensuring that businesses directing customers towards gambling operate responsibly, but regulators still differ considerably over whether that is best achieved by licensing affiliates themselves or holding operators accountable for their activity.

Final Thoughts

European gambling markets face many of the same regulatory challenges, but the examples of Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Romania show there is no single right way to solve them.

Each market has different player behaviours, regulatory priorities and commercial realities. What works in one jurisdiction may not translate neatly to another, particularly when regulators are trying to protect players while keeping the licensed market competitive.

No regulatory model can simply be copied and pasted. But comparing how different markets are approaching the same problems can help regulators and operators understand what is working, where unintended consequences are emerging and what lessons can be applied elsewhere.

Those comparisons will be central to discussions at SBC Summit Europe, taking place at RAI Amsterdam from 19–21 April, where operators, regulators and other industry stakeholders will examine how Europe’s markets can respond to these shared challenges.